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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze whether leverage had impacts on investment in the
period 1999-2009, and whether these impacts, if they exist, differed among
companies with different investment opportunities and with different major
shareholders. In order to identify governance with different major
shareholders, we grouped China’s listed firms into central government
owned firms (CSOEs), local government owned firms (LSOEs) and
non-state-owned firms (NONSOEs). Our results are as follows. Firstly, our
analysis reveals that leverage does have significantly negative impacts on
CSOE, LSOE and NONSOE investments. Secondly, in LSOEs and
NONSOEs, negative leverage impacts on low-growth firms are stronger than
average firms, implying that a disciplinary effect of leverage over investment
can be found in LSOEs and NONSOEs. Finally, however, no such effect can
be observed in CSOEs. We have provided a first finding that the effect of
leverage varies according to a firm’s major shareholders.
Keywords: leverage; major shareholders; State ownership; China
JEL: G31, G32, G34
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1. Introduction
China has become one of the engines of world growth due to its economic
size and speed of growth. However, there is some concern about the
long-term perspective, since Chinese economic growth depends heavily upon
fixed capital formation. The lack of a proper governance mechanism and soft
budget problems, particularly found in state-owned enterprises, may cause
overinvestment in corporate sectors. In this paper, we investigate the nature
of the largest shareholders in China’s listed firms, focusing on the impact of
leverage on investment.
A large number of previous studies show that if asymmetry of
information exists, financing will affect the firms’ investment behavior. In
other words, in an incomplete market, because there is an agency problem
between the debt-holders, managers, and shareholders, this will lead to an
overinvestment problem or debt overhang problem (Myers, 1977; Jensen,
1986). Lang et al. (1996), McConnell and Servaes (1995), Ahn et al. (2006),
and Aivazian (2005) analyze the debt disciplinary effect by using the
financial data of listed firms in the U.S. or Canada.
On the other hand, since many banks in emerging countries are
controlled by their governments and tend to be used by politicians, it is
generally felt that state-owned banks have little incentive to monitor
borrowers. As Sapienza (2004), La Porta et al. (2002) have found, political
factors affect the lending behavior of state-owned banks and the banks do
not always lend to profitable firms.
Many large banks in China have been listed. However they are still
controlled by the government. Up to now, firms almost always borrow from
banks and other financial institutions, because the bonds market in China is
underdeveloped. It is considered that the lending behavior shown in
Sapienza (2004), La Porta et al. (2002), exists in China. Bai et al. (2003)
suggest that in order to maintain state-owned firms trading on the market,
the government uses bank loans or subsidies to bail out listed firms. Firth et
al. (2008) find that as a result of the lending behavior of state-owned banks,
bank loans have little effect on the investments of unprofitable firms,
particularly for state-owned firms. From these empirical studies, it is
considered that the debt disciplinary effect suggested by Jensen (1986), will
not function very well for China’s firms.
However, as Chen et al. (2009) argue, previous studies have failed to
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identify the nature of the state share, and if the nature of state ownership is
ignored, the real impact of the state shareholders will be obscured. They also
pointed out that, “In China, the state’s ownership of firms is undertaken by
different types of agencies and we argue that the objectives of these
agency-types dictate the extent of political intervention and the degree of
commercialization of listed companies they invest in” (Chen et al. 2009,
P172). Therefore, it is considered that the different nature of major
state-owned shareholders has different effects on the ease of financing and
monitoring of debt-holders in China. It will be very interesting to compare
the different leverage effects, not only between state firms and non-state
firms, but also between firms with different state shareholders.
In this paper, we provide a thorough empirical analysis of the leverage
impacts on listed firms in China by using financial data from 1999 to 2009.
Firstly, we look at whether leverages have effects on firms. Secondly, we
focus on whether the impacts of leverage on investment are any different
among listed firms with differing investment opportunities. Thirdly, we shed
light on whether the leverage effects depend on the nature of the largest
shareholders. The most important feature of China’s listed firms is that the
largest shareholders have overwhelming power to control the firms because
their ratio is much higher than the second largest shareholders. Thus we
group the listed firms in China into three types by the nature of the largest
shareholders: CSOEs (firms whose largest shareholders are controlled by the
central government), LSOEs (firms whose largest shareholders are the local
government or are controlled by the local government), and NONSOEs (firms
whose largest shareholders are non-state firms or individuals).
Our method of analysis is described below. First, we add the leverage to
an investment equation to examine whether debt sensitivity exists in the
investment activities of China’s listed firms. Then, similar to Lang et al.
(1996), Ahn et al. (2006), Aivazian et al. (2005), and Firth et al. (2008), we
use the ratio of the market value to the replacement cost of assets (Tobin’s Q),
to distinguish corporate growth potential, and add the cross term between
them and the leverage to the investment equation. Since high-growth firms
have promising investment opportunities, they are believed to be prone to
underinvestment due to leverage. On the other hand, as low-growth firms
lack promising investment opportunities, their leverages are believed to
keep them from overinvestment.
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Firth et al. (2008) studied the impact of bank loans on investment in
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, but did not focus on the nature of
the SOE shareholders. Unlike Firth et al. (2008), we take a detailed look at
the major shareholder, particularly differentiating between CSOEs and
LSOEs. CSOEs are typically owned by a large holding company with many
subsidiaries. Some of these are flagship companies, listed as one of Fortune
500 companies. On the other hand, LSOEs are generally smaller and do not
have the deep pockets of the CSOEs.
Our key findings are as follows. Firstly, we find that the leverage has a
significant negative impact on fixed investment. Therefore, managers of
LSOEs and NONSOEs care about debt when they make investment
decisions, because debt is not free for them. Secondly, we find that leverage
works more strongly on low-growth LSOEs and NONSOEs. This means that
disciplinary effects of leverage exist in LSOEs and NONSOEs. Thirdly, we
find that the disciplinary press of leverage shown in Jensen (1986) does not
exist in CSOEs. Therefore, rather than state share or non-state share, we
argue that leverage impacts depend on who are the major shareholders.
A number of empirical studies have found the existence of debt
disciplinary effects (such as Aivazian et al., 2005; Lang et al., 1996; Ahn et
al., 2006), while Firth (2008) has found that bank leverage weakens the debt
disciplinary effect on state firms. Our study further investigates the nature
of state-owned companies, and in contrast with Firth et al. (2008), we find
differences between CSOEs and LSOEs in terms of the debt effect. Our
in-depth analysis of the debt disciplinary effect in China by grouping the
major shareholders, implies that the nature of major shareholders has an
important bearing on whether the overinvestment restraining effect occurs
or not. Therefore we contribute not only to studies on the relation between
leverage and investment, but also to studies on ownership and debt
discipline.
This paper is structured as follows. We survey previous studies on debt
and corporate investment in Section 2 and briefly introduce the ownership
and motivation of listed firms in China in Section 3. In Section 4, we explain
our method of empirical analysis. In Section 5, we introduce our data. We
attempt an interpretation of the estimation results in Section 6, followed by
conclusions in Section 7.
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2. Previous Studies on leverage and investment
The impact of liabilities on investment decisions by companies has
drawn keen attention. According to the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, the level
of liabilities does not affect corporate investment behaviors in a perfect
market. In other words, given simple assumptions, it is noted that leverage
has no effect on fund procurement. However, it is noted that liabilities have
negative effects on firms’ investment behaviors through the following
channels. Firstly, as increased liabilities raise bankruptcy risk, corporate
managers worry about the possibility of shareholders holding them
accountable, and thus tend to curb borrowings and/or reduce investments.
Underinvestment problems may arise as a result. Secondly, as larger interest
payment burdens resulting from higher debts reduce funds in hand, so debt
has a negative impact on the investment activities of companies with
promising investment opportunities. This is called the “debt overhang
hypothesis” (Myers, 1977; Stulz, 1990).
Meanwhile, in contrast to the negative effect of liabilities on corporate
management, Jensen (1986) points out that liabilities can help avoid
overinvestment by reducing the cash flow left up to corporate managers’ own
discretion and constraining investments in investment projects that might
be desirable for corporate managers but not desirable for firms’ future
profitability. Jensen argues that whether liabilities restrain overinvestment
depends largely on whether companies have growth opportunities. In short,
Jensen points out that liabilities have (not only the negative effect of causing
underinvestment by high-growth companies but also) the potentially positive
effect of restraining overinvestment by low-growth firms. Like Jensen (1986),
Stulz (1990) and Hart and Moore (1995) argue that liabilities effectively
restrain overinvestment. They reason that increased liabilities, by enlarging
repayment obligations, not only curtail free cash flow but also raise the
possibility of corporate bankruptcies, thus prompting corporate managers to
reduce investments and sell off unprofitable business divisions.
Some empirical studies have investigated the relationship between the
investment and debt. McConnell and Servaes (1995) use cross-sectional data
to analyze U.S. listed companies in 1976, 1986 and 1988. They indicate that
market value was negatively correlated with the debt ratio of companies
with high growth opportunities and positively correlated with the debt ratio
of companies with few growth opportunities. With the exception of
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McConnell and Servaes (1995), most studies use Tobin’s Q to classify
whether or not firms have investment opportunities. Lang et al. (1996),
based on an analysis of the relationship between the debt ratio and the rate
of growth of companies, point out that for companies with fewer investment
opportunities (i.e. companies with a low Tobin’s Q), there is a negative
correlation between debt ratio and investment. On the other hand, for firms
with excellent investment opportunities, increased liabilities do not
necessarily hamper investment. Lang et al. interpret this analytical outcome
as reflecting the disciplinary role of liabilities.
Looking at more recent studies, Aivazian et al. (2005) analyze the
impact of liabilities on fixed investment using Canadian firm-level data, and
demonstrate that companies with fewer investment opportunities are more
vulnerable to the impact of liabilities than companies with many investment
opportunities. Further, according to Ahn et al. (2006), diversified companies
tend to have higher debt ratios than focused counterparts and diversified
companies make larger investments (net cost of capital/sales) than focused
counterparts. They also point out that debt ratios influence management
decisions on investment and that diversified companies can overcome the
constraints of debt ratios through the distribution of liabilities service by
corporate managers.
Thus, previous studies have verified the impact of leverage on
investment in industrial countries as well as the effects of leverage in
restraining overinvestment and facilitating underinvestment. However,
there are few studies on corporate leverage in developing countries. Firth et
al. (2008) examine the effects of bank leverage on investment in China’s
listed firms and find that the effect of bank leverage is weaker in firms with
higher state share and poor performance. However they do not take into
account the heterogeneous nature of state-owned enterprises. Thus, in this
paper, we attempt to grasp more clearly the leverage impacts on fixed
investment in firms by type of major shareholder.
3. Ownership and motivation of listed firms in China
The reform of China’s enterprises began in the 1980s. In order to deal
separately with property rights and management rights, Stated-owned
Assets Management Bureaus (SAMBs) were established in 1988 in the
central government and in each local government. Assets management
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companies administered state-owned firms under the SAMBs. Therefore, on
paper, it appeared as if government and management activities had been
separated. In 1995, as a means to promote privatization, the central
government set out the policy of “managing the large SOEs (state-owned
firms), letting go of the small SOEs” (Zhua da fang xiao in Chinese). At that
time, there were 632 SOEs that belonged to the central government and a
number of other non-privatized SOEs that belonged to local governments.
Despite the administration by the SAMBs, the governance of SOEs
lacked clarity since various ministries controlled different aspects such as
financing, personal affairs, and the salaries of employees. In order to resolve
this lack of clarity in governance and improve governance overall, or, in a
word, in order to prevent the involvement of ministries, the State-owned
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was
established in 2003 in the central government and in local governments to
replace the SAMBs. OECD (2009) suggests that SOEs’ role in the Chinese
economy can be presented by the classification of central and local SOEs.
Following OECD (2009), we classify China’s SOEs into CSOEs and LSOEs
(Figure 1).
By July 2008, the number of holding firms managed by SASAC in the
central government had fallen to just 149, but the number of their subsidiary
companies and holding companies was still over 10,000 and they continue to
play a very important role in the Chinese economy. For example, the total
assets of firms managed by SASAC in central government, have risen to
make up over 50% of state firms’ the total assets (OECD, 2009). Therefore
the largest shareholders of CSOEs are typically the largest and most
important firms in key industries, and they have become symbols of the
Chinese economy. From 2000, SOEs actively started to internationalize
following the “Going-global strategy” (zou chu qu in Chinese) proposed by the
government. The government launched several policies to provide funds for
overseas investments by SOEs. One of the most important objects was to
obtain large-scale overseas resources and acquire high technology from the
large SOEs. For example, resource acquisitions by Sinopec around the world
have attracted attention in recent years. From the above, it is obvious that
CSOEs are the most important firms in China and that their operations
reflect the strategy of the central government. The governments control the
firms not only through intervention in management but also by providing
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funds. Thus, CSOEs can obtain subsidies from the central government, but
can also receive financing from financial institutions much more easily than
NONSOEs or LSOEs (OECD, 2009).
The largest shareholders of LSOEs are local SOEs or local SASACs
controlled by local governments. Cheung et al. (2008) suggest that local
governments may have fewer resources than the central government to
perform a social role, leading them to search for alternative sources of
revenue. OECD (2009) suggests that listed SOEs are valuable assets for
their owners, especially local governments, because the dividends are
important revenue sources for them. Hence, in contrast to the central
government, local governments have little incentive to provide relief to
LSOEs when they fall into difficulty.
The majority shareholders of the NONSOEs are non-state-owned firms
or individuals. The government has little influence over them. As in the case
of LSOEs, financing from financial institutions and obtaining boosts from
the government are not as easy as they are for CSOEs.
From the above, we can conclude that the debt disciplinary effect may be
different for CSOEs, LSOEs and NONSOEs. To take an example, one of the
largest IT firms, Datang Mobile, whose majority shareholder is a
centrally-owned firm, ran into financial difficulties, posting two consecutive
years of negative earnings from 2005. By 2007, it was saddled with debts of
almost 700 million yuan, three times its annual sales. In 2007, with
government involvement, it was able to receive financing of 1.5 billion yuan
from the People’s insurance Company of China to reorganize. On the other
hand, firms whose majority shareholder is a local government will receive
different treatment. Aokema, an electronics maker controlled by a local
government, found it easy to find financing when the electronics market was
strong. However, when the market weakened in 2006, banks and other
creditors accelerated repayments, and Aokema faced serious financing
difficulties. Although it was able in the end to overcome the shortage of funds
with the aid of the local government, we note that financial institutions and
governments have differing degrees of incentives towards CSOEs and
LSOEs. As a NONSOE firm, for example, Daobo was sued by the Shenzhen
Development Bank because it could not afford to repay its debts.
4. Empirical Analysis
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As with previous studies (Lang, Ofek and Stulz, 1996; Aivazian et al.,
2005; and Ahn et al., 2006), the analysis in this paper uses Tobin’s Q as a key
explanatory variable of the investment equation, and we conduct an
estimation by adding the debt ratio to this. A high Tobin’s Q indicates a high
market value relative to total assets, suggesting that a firm has ample
business opportunities. Thus, with the addition of Tobin’s Q to the
investment equation, it is possible to verify the impact of the debt ratio on
fixed investment while controlling companies’ business opportunities. As
corporate investments are found to be influenced by the availability of
internal funds in Fazzari et al. (1988) and Hoshi et al. (1991), the analysis in
this paper adds the free cash flow ratio to the estimate equation as a control
variable. Following previous studies, we also use total assets as a control
variable to control firm’s scale.
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 1 3 , 4 ,
,
' lni t i t i t i t i t
t i i t
Investment Tobin sQ Leverage Cash size
Yeardummy
    
 
     
  
(1)
tiInvestment , : Fixed investment ratio (fixed investment/total asset) of firm i at
time t
, 1' i tTobin sQ  : Tobin’s Q1of firm i at time t-1
, 1i tLeverage  : Leverage (total liabilities/total assets, bank liabilities/total
assets) of firm i at time t-1; or average leverage during the
previous three years of firm i at time t-1
,i tCash : Ratio of free cash flow to total assets of firm i at time t
,ln i tSize : Log of total assets of firm i at time t
1 Lindenberg and Ross (1981) calculate Tobin’s Q as the market value of a company
divided by the replacement value of its assets. However, as data available in this
study is limited, it is difficult to calculate the replacement value of assets. Since
Perfect and Wiles (1994) use the book value of total assets, rather than the
replacement value of total assets, as the denominator of Simple Q, we calculate
Tobin’s Q in this study according to the definition of Simple Q in Perfect and Wiles
(1994). Thus, Tobin’s Q in this study is (market value + liabilities)/book value of
total assets.
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i : Individual effect
,i t : Error term
We add the yeardummy to the estimate equation to take macro factors
into consideration. Differing from Firth et al. (2008), we use alternative
measures of leverage to examine the relation between leverage and
investment. More specifically, one is the total leverage without any regard to
the source of funds and the other is the bank leverage (borrowings from
banks). Aivazian et al. (2005) point out that an endogeneity problem will
occur and estimators will be biased if unobservable factors are ignored. An
example given in Firth et al. (2008) is that firms may obtain a bank loan and
acquire valuable projects much more easily if they have a good relationship
with the government. In this paper, following Aivazian et al. (2005), and
Firth et al. (2008), we use not only a fixed effect model, but also instrument
variables in order to avoid the endogeneity problem and biased estimation
results. We also use the average leverage during the previous three years to
check the robustness.
In previous studies, debt was found to exert a differing influence on
investment by companies with high or low values of Q, apparently because
the value of Q represents the extent of ease of access to funds on the capital
market. In other words, since companies with greater investment
opportunities (a high Tobin’s Q) find it relatively easy to finance on the
capital market, their investments are less sensitive to the level of debt. On
the other hand, since companies with few investment opportunities find it
relatively difficult to raise funds on the market, they appear to be more
sensitive to the level of debt in their investment decisions. Lang et al. (1996),
Aivazian et al. (2005) and Arikawa et al. (2003) differentiate the investment
opportunities of firms using the value of Tobin’s Q and demonstrate that
firms with few investment opportunities respond more strongly to the level
of debt than firms with greater investment opportunities. In this paper we
also define low-growth firms with the use of Tobin’s Q, and examine
differences in the impact of the level of debt on investment by average firms
and low-growth firms. Here, lower one-third of companies in terms of the
value of Tobin’s Q are defined as low-growth firms (LQ). Therefore, on the
basis of equation (1), we also estimate the following equation (2), with the
addition of the cross terms of the leverage with the low growth firm dummy.
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5. Data
This study makes use of the China Stock Market Financial Database
Annual Report and China Listed Firm’s Corporate Governance Research
Database, both provided by GTA Information Technology Co., Ltd. We used
the 1999-2009 financial data for manufacturing companies listed on the
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. We choose 1999 as the starting
year because shareholder information was only available from that year.
Furthermore, even if we were to acquire shareholder information for the
years prior to 1999, this would not be appropriate since new accounting
principles (GAAP)2 have been implemented by listed firms from 1998. The
database includes financial data for 1693 listed firms at the end of 2009.
However, due to missing data and outliers (three standard deviations from
the mean), the data for fewer than 1,693 firms was actually used. Our data is
an unbalanced panel containing 7,128 samples.
In China, the types of shareholders are categorized into state, local legal
person, foreign legal person, management, employee, and individual. China
Listed Firm’s Corporate Governance Research Database contains
information about the largest shareholders, such as the name of the largest
shareholder and type of the largest shareholder. This database has no
information about CSOEs or LSOEs. However the names of holding
companies controlled by the SASAC in the central government are listed on
the website of the SASAC3. We use this list to divide firms whose largest
shareholder is the state into CSOEs and LSOEs, while those whose largest
shareholders are not the state, such as local legal persons, are defined as
NONSOEs.
China’s financial markets, including the stock and bond markets, are not
as fully developed as those of other developed countries. The Shanghai Stock
Exchange was established in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in
2 “Gu Fen You Xian Gong Si Kuai Ji Zhi Du” in Chinese.
3 The address of the SASAC website is as follows.
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html
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1991. Yet, the most important financing methods for listed companies, other
than their own funds in hand, remains trade credit and borrowings from
banks. Until now, the most important debt-holder for listed firms in China
are financial institutions.
Table 1 shows changes in the two measures of leverage by CSOEs,
LSOEs, and NONSOEs during the period 1999-2009. The median total
leverage for all samples increased to 50% from 2005. The median bank
leverage for all samples hovered between 19% and 24% from 1999 to 2009.
The trends in total leverages are very similar among the three types of firms,
which are on upward trend. However, different trends of bank leverage are
showed among three types of firms. CSOEs present increasing trend, while
LSOEs and NONSOEs show decreasing trend from 2006 and 2003
respectively.
Table 2 lists the definitions of the variables used in the models in the
preceding section, while Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics of these
variables. The mean of the investment ratio (fixed investment/total assets) is
0.1 for all firms. The mean of NONSOEs is a little higher than that of LSOEs,
and NONSOEs also have a larger standard deviation. The leverages of
CSOEs are not higher ratio than LSOEs and NONSOEs, while CSOEs have
a lower Tobin’s Q than LSOEs and NONSOEs. The average value of Tobin’s
Q is 2.22 for all samples. The factors behind the high value of Tobin’s Q for
listed firms in China apparently include the market’s high expectations for
growth opportunities of Chinese firms due to the high growth of the Chinese
economy in recent years.4
Table 4 shows the correlations between the variables used in the
analysis in this paper. The two alternative measures of leverage, are
negatively correlated with investment. From Table 4, we consider that
multicollinearity is not a serious problem because of low correlation among
explanatory variables.
6. Estimation Results
6.1 Basic Estimation Result
Table 5 shows the basic estimation results of equation (1) by using the
two alternative measures of leverage for the three types of firms. We use the
4 Chen et al. (2009), Huang and Song (2006), Lin and Su (2008) also calculate
Tobin’s Q for listed companies and come up with a high value of over 2.
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method shown in White (1980) to obtain a robust standard error. Columns
1-4 show the estimation results of the impact of the total leverage on fixed
investment. The impact of the total leverage on investment is significantly
negative at the 1% level. The sensitivity of fixed investment to the total
leverage is around -0.166 for CSOEs, -0.064 for LSOEs, and -0.066 for
NONSOEs. This indicates that the total leverage does have a negative
impact on investment by Chinese listed firms. In addition, as Tobin’s Q, an
indication of available investment opportunities, is significantly positive at
the 1% level, except for CSOEs, the estimation results show that firms with a
higher value of Q invest more. Since free cash flow ratio and total assets, the
control variables, have a significantly positive correlation to investment, it is
implied that firms with ample internal funds or large-scale firms tend to
make large amounts of investments.
Columns 5-8 show the impact on investment by bank leverage. Columns
5-8 show that the impact of bank leverage on investment is significantly
negative at at least the 10% level. Tobin’s Q, which controls investment
opportunities for firms, is significantly positive at the 1% level, except for
CSOEs. The estimation results of free cash flow ratio, and total assets are
consistent with columns 1-4. The estimation results in this section confirm
that leverage has negative impacts on investment. We can conclude that
leverage is not a free source for CSOEs, LSOEs and NONSOEs. However,
Table 5 does not differentiate between underinvestment due to high leverage
and restraint of overinvestment due to the disciplinary effect of the leverage.
To examine differences in the impact of leverage on investment by
average firms and low-growth firms, we estimate equation (2), which adds
the debt ratios and the respective cross terms of the dummy for low-growth
firms (LQ) and the leverages. Table 6 shows the estimation results. The
subject of greatest interest in this paper is to investigate the leverage effect
on investment for different shareholders. Columns 1-4 show the impact of
the total leverage on fixed investment. It is confirmed anew that the total
leverage has significantly negative impacts at the 1% level. It is also
reaffirmed that Tobin’s Q is significantly positive for investment except for
CSOEs. The cross term of the dummy for low-growth firms and total leverage
is significantly negative at the 1% level, except for CSOEs. In other words,
we find that the sensitivity of low-growth LSOEs to the total leverage
(-0.058-0.041) is higher than that of average LSOEs (-0.058) and the
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sensitivity of low growth NONSOEs (-0.064-0.049) is higher than that of
average NONSOEs (-0.064). 5 The estimation results suggest that
low-growth LSOEs or NONSOEs, which do not have highly profitable
investment opportunities, tend to respond more strongly to the disciplinary
effect of total leverage. Generally speaking, low-growth companies show a
tendency toward overinvestment. Thus, total leverage appears to restrain
overinvestment by curbing investment by low-growth firms, which have a
tendency toward overinvestment. This therefore implies that the disciplinary
effect of restrained overinvestment occurs in LSOEs and NONSOEs. These
estimation results are consistent with the results from U.S. firms by Lang,
Ofek and Stulz (1996) as well as the estimation results concerning Japanese
companies of Arikawa et al. (2003). However, we failed to find the
disciplinary effect of total liabilities in CSOEs. For control variables, it is
shown again that free cash flow and total assets have significantly positive
impacts on investment.
Columns 5-8 show the results of the analysis on the differences in the
impact of bank leverage on investment by high-growth and low-growth firms.
Again it is confirmed that bank leverage has a significantly negative impact
on investment at the 10% level. The impact of Tobin’s Q on investment is
significantly positive for LSOEs and NONSOEs. The cross term for LQ and
bank leverage is significantly negative at the 1% level, except for CSOEs. In
other words, the sensitivity of low-growth LSOEs and NONSOEs is higher
than that of average firms. These estimation results indicate that the
disciplinary effect of bank leverage restrains overinvestment by LSOEs and
NONSOEs. However, we do not find any evidence that Chinese banks
restrain overinvestment by CSOEs through their lending operations.
Again, the results of average leverage over the previous three years in
Tables 7 and 8 confirm our previous findings that there is a negative
leverage effect on investment and that the negative leverage effect is large
for the low-growth LSOEs and NONSOEs but not for the low-growth CSOEs.
Although the leverage used in our analysis is based on figures for the
prior accounting year, it is thought that China’s firms set the level of
investment in the current year on the basis of the composition of capital at
the prior years. Thus, using the investment equation, we find that leverage
restrains overinvestment by LSOEs and NONSOEs, but do not find any
5 Here, the absolute value of the coefficient is defined as the sensitivity.
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2012-006
14
evidence of this for CSOEs. Since CSOEs are the most important firms in the
key industries, they tend to be used as a channel for attaining political goals,
or soft budget constraints, and thus debt-holders impose few restrictions on
investments by low growth CSOEs.
6.2 Estimation of instrumental variables (IV)
In the baseline regression, we employed Tobin’s Q to control investment
opportunities. However, as Aivazian et al. (2005) suggest that investment
opportunities are affected by not only public information (Tobin’s Q) but also
inside information, some omitted variables may therefore lead to an
estimation bias. Further, as Firth et al. (2008) suggest, a negative relation
between investment and leverage may occur due to a manager’s perception
of gloomy prospects. In this section, we use the instrument variable method
to improve this endogeneity problem.
Aivazian et al. (2005) indicate that tangible assets increase the use of
the leverage by reducing the bankruptcy cost, and find that the correlation
between tangible assets and investment opportunities is not high. At the
first stage, the firm’s leverage decision function consists of the ratio of
tangible assets to total assets, as instrumental variables, and those in the
investment function as control variables. We conduct an F-test to test the
hypothesis that the instruments cannot explain firm leverage, and we reject
this hypothesis at the 1% level. Though the results of the first stage are not
shown here in the interest of terseness, we can provide the first stage
regression results upon request.
Table 9 reports the estimation results of the instrument variable method
for equation (1) for different leverages and different types of firms. It shows
that the negative relationship between investment and leverage is
statistically significantly at the 1% level for LSOEs and NONSOEs. Table 10
shows the estimation results for equation (2). The interactive term of firms
with low growth opportunities and leverage are statistically significantly
negative for LSOEs and NONSOEs. This means that the effects of leverage
on investment by low-growth firms are larger than the average of firms. We
fail to find a larger negative effect of leverage on investment by low-growth
CSOE’s.
As with Firth et al (2008), the coefficients of the instrument variable
method are larger than OLS coefficients. Firth et al (2008, pp.650) explained
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that “the existence of potential measurement error, which would tend to
‘attenuate’ the coefficient estimate toward zero” is a “regular finding in the
finance and growth literature.” Overall, we obtained consistent results for
the relation between leverage and investment by using the fixed effect model
and the instrument variable method.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we employ a panel financial data set for China’s listed
firms in order to analyze whether leverage had impacts on investment in the
period 1999-2009, and whether these impacts, if they exist, differ among
companies with different investment opportunities and with different major
shareholders. In order to identify governance with different major
shareholders, we grouped China’s listed firms into CSOEs, LSOEs and
NONSOEs. Our results are as follows. Firstly, our analysis reveals that
leverage does have significantly negative impacts on investments by CSOEs,
LSOEs and NONSOEs. Secondly, in LSOEs and NONSOEs, negative
leverage impacts on low-growth firms are stronger than for average firms,
implying that a disciplinary effect of leverage over investment can be found
in LSOEs and NONSOEs. Finally, however, no such disciplinary effect can be
observed in CSOEs.
In contrast to Firth et al. (2008), who suggest that banks impose fewer
restrictions on the capital expenditures of state-owned firms, grouping the
firms into three types according to the largest shareholders, we find that the
debt disciplinary effect over investment can be found not only in
non-state-owned firms but also in local government owned firms. This paper
suggests that the corporate governance mechanism in state-owned
enterprises in China is not always inefficient. Through it, we contribute to
the literature on transitional economies by distinguishing the monitoring
functions of different types of state shareholders under China’s gradual
privatization process. Our findings can contribute toward a better
understanding not only of the differences in investment behaviors of listed
firms with different ownership identities, but also the nature and
characteristics of economic reforms in China.
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Figure1 Classification of state owned firms
Central government
Local government State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission of the
State Council (Central government)
State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission of the
State Council (Local government)
State owned firms
Indirect central government control
Direct central government controlLSOE
CSOE
State owned firms
LSOE
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Table1 Trends of leverages
Year Mean Median St.dev. Mean Median St.dev.
1999 0.420 0.407 0.182 0.208 0.194 0.137
2000 0.427 0.412 0.193 0.206 0.192 0.141
2001 0.477 0.425 0.599 0.235 0.213 0.233
2002 0.509 0.447 0.615 0.243 0.221 0.252
2003 0.548 0.468 1.030 0.261 0.236 0.373
2004 0.550 0.498 0.723 0.261 0.242 0.298
2005 0.638 0.522 1.682 0.277 0.239 0.533
2006 0.654 0.538 2.010 0.271 0.231 0.622
2007 0.601 0.510 2.057 0.252 0.222 0.592
2008 0.624 0.512 3.123 0.254 0.213 0.839
2009 0.562 0.503 1.349 0.225 0.195 0.373
Year Mean Median St.dev. Mean Median St.dev.
1999 0.401 0.403 0.173 0.181 0.196 0.130
2000 0.387 0.347 0.175 0.156 0.145 0.131
2001 0.407 0.422 0.166 0.169 0.177 0.131
2002 0.440 0.440 0.163 0.176 0.171 0.144
2003 0.436 0.404 0.169 0.187 0.169 0.141
2004 0.458 0.448 0.164 0.217 0.217 0.153
2005 0.500 0.510 0.158 0.229 0.220 0.169
2006 0.548 0.542 0.253 0.253 0.239 0.183
2007 0.540 0.524 0.242 0.253 0.228 0.178
2008 0.542 0.556 0.190 0.262 0.223 0.201
2009 0.549 0.571 0.209 0.263 0.247 0.203
Year Mean Median St.dev. Mean Median St.dev.
1999 0.432 0.425 0.184 0.217 0.207 0.136
2000 0.436 0.417 0.198 0.213 0.199 0.139
2001 0.482 0.426 0.659 0.239 0.213 0.242
2002 0.494 0.446 0.501 0.240 0.225 0.210
2003 0.488 0.463 0.325 0.240 0.236 0.162
2004 0.511 0.499 0.354 0.251 0.242 0.170
2005 0.623 0.518 2.018 0.277 0.269 0.633
2006 0.671 0.543 2.584 0.284 0.238 0.812
2007 0.659 0.530 2.857 0.269 0.227 0.813
2008 0.536 0.548 0.217 0.236 0.224 0.161
2009 0.541 0.554 0.246 0.228 0.207 0.173
Year Mean Median St.dev. Mean Median St.dev.
1999 0.394 0.373 0.178 0.193 0.175 0.143
2000 0.411 0.387 0.182 0.196 0.188 0.147
2001 0.481 0.419 0.467 0.244 0.223 0.225
2002 0.584 0.450 0.956 0.271 0.216 0.376
2003 0.722 0.485 0.190 0.330 0.253 0.663
2004 0.643 0.502 1.162 0.290 0.242 0.461
2005 0.694 0.528 0.122 0.288 0.243 0.395
2006 0.654 0.528 1.071 0.256 0.224 0.267
2007 0.543 0.492 0.592 0.231 0.214 0.205
2008 0.732 0.461 4.668 0.272 0.205 1.243
2009 0.572 0.478 1.680 0.219 0.181 0.446
All Samples
Bank loan/Total assetsTotal liabilities/Total assets
Bank loan/Total assetsTotal liabilities/Total assets
CSOE Samples
Bank loan/Total assetsTotal liabilities/Total assets
Bank loan/Total assetsTotal liabilities/Total assets
NONSOE Samples
LSOE Samples
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Table 2 Definition of variables
Definitions
Fixed investment ratio for firm i at time t-1 Cash paid to acquire fixed assets, etc./total assets
Total liabilities ratio for firm i at time t-1 Total liabilities/total assets
Bank liabilities ratio for firm i at time t-1 Bank liabilities/total assets
Cash flow for firm i at time t-1 (Net profit + depreciation of fixed assets)/fixed assets t-1
Tobin’s Q for firm i at time t-1 (Number of shares x average stock price + total liabilities)/total assets
Dummy for Tobin’s Q for firm i at time t-1 being in the lower
one-third Dummy for low-growth firms
Firm size natural logarithm of total assets
Yeardummy Yeardummy
Variables
1, tiDebt
tiCF ,
1, tiQ
tiState ,
tiInvestment ,
, 1i tLQ 
,i tsize
,i tCash
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Investment 7361 0.10 0.09 606 0.10 0.08 4148 0.10 0.09 2607 0.10 0.10
Bank leverage 7418 0.23 0.16 609 0.22 0.17 4192 0.23 0.15 2617 0.24 0.19
Total leverage 7477 0.50 0.30 614 0.49 0.21 4213 0.48 0.23 2650 0.52 0.39
Tobin's Q 7423 2.22 1.35 614 2.14 1.32 4192 2.19 1.30 2617 2.28 1.44
Cash 7390 0.03 0.08 610 0.04 0.06 4180 0.03 0.07 2600 0.03 0.08
Size 8449 15.80 0.98 647 16.14 1.10 4743 15.90 0.94 3059 15.57 0.97
All CSOEs LSOEs NONSOEs
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Table 4 Correlation of variables
1 2 3 4 5 6
1.Investment 1
2.Total leverage -0.19 1
3.Bank leverage -0.08 0.68 1
4.Tobin's Q 0.10 -0.03 -0.12 1
5.Size 0.18 0.03 0.08 -0.38 1
6.Cash 0.33 -0.20 -0.25 0.12 0.21 1
Note: In this table Total leverage and Bank leverage are the leverages for the prior accounting year.
For terseness, the correlation about average leverage over previous three years upon request.
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Table 5 Results for Equation (1) (Fixed effect model；leverage for the prior accounting year)
All CSOEs LSOEs NONSOEs All CSOEs LSOEs NONSOEs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Leverage -0.057*** -0.166*** -0.064*** -0.066*** -0.105*** -0.085* -0.104*** -0.138***
-0.007 -0.043 -0.013 -0.013 -0.011 -0.044 -0.015 -0.02
Tobin's Qt-1 0.013*** 0.005 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.005 0.014*** 0.012***
-0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
Size 0.026*** 0.045*** 0.033*** 0.008 0.031*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.014**
-0.003 -0.009 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.009 -0.004 -0.006
Cash 0.236*** 0.226*** 0.226*** 0.225*** 0.217*** 0.231*** 0.212*** 0.188***
-0.016 -0.064 -0.024 -0.03 -0.017 -0.067 -0.024 -0.03
Constant -0.317*** -0.592*** -0.456*** -0.019 -0.389*** -0.552*** -0.543*** -0.118
-0.048 -0.144 -0.07 -0.104 -0.048 -0.142 -0.07 -0.102
Yeardummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7128 574 4048 2506 7072 569 4028 2475
Number of Stock Code 994 109 628 655 993 108 628 654
R-squared 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Leverage=(Total Liabilities/Total assets)t-1 Leverage=(Bank Liabilities/Total assets) t-1
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Table 6 Results for Equation (2) (Fixed effect model; leverage for the prior accounting year)
All CSOEs LSOEs NONSOEs All CSOEs LSOEs NONSOEs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Leverage -0.053*** -0.165*** -0.058*** -0.064*** -0.086*** -0.078* -0.084*** -0.118***
-0.007 -0.044 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.046 -0.015 -0.02
LQ×Leverage -0.043*** -0.003 -0.041*** -0.049*** -0.063*** -0.017 -0.060*** -0.081***
-0.005 -0.016 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.031 -0.012 -0.017
Tobin's Qt-1 0.013*** 0.005 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.006 0.014*** 0.012***
-0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
Size 0.030*** 0.045*** 0.037*** 0.012* 0.034*** 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.018***
-0.003 -0.009 -0.004 -0.007 -0.003 -0.009 -0.004 -0.006
Cash 0.218*** 0.224*** 0.204*** 0.215*** 0.205*** 0.226*** 0.197*** 0.180***
-0.016 -0.066 -0.024 -0.029 -0.017 -0.068 -0.023 -0.029
Constant -0.384*** -0.594*** -0.507*** -0.074 -0.438*** -0.556*** -0.576*** -0.167
-0.048 -0.145 -0.07 -0.104 -0.048 -0.142 -0.07 -0.102
Yeardummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7128 574 4048 2506 7072 569 4028 2475
Number of Stock Code 994 109 628 655 993 108 628 654
R-squared 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Leverage=(Total Liabilities/Total assets)t-1 Leverage=(Bank Liabilities/Total assets) t-1
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Table 7: Results for Equation (1) (Fixed effect model; average leverage over previous three years)
All CSOEs LSOEs NONSOEs All CSOEs LSOEs NONSOEs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Leverage -0.093*** -0.370*** -0.130*** -0.070*** -0.175*** -0.167** -0.239*** -0.153***
-0.019 -0.096 -0.035 -0.024 -0.017 -0.07 -0.024 -0.03
Tobin's Qt-1 0.009*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.004 0.008*** 0.009***
-0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003
Size 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.024** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.044*** 0.024***
-0.004 -0.01 -0.006 -0.009 -0.004 -0.009 -0.005 -0.008
Cash 0.214*** 0.270*** 0.193*** 0.197*** 0.203*** 0.241*** 0.190*** 0.187***
-0.019 -0.08 -0.028 -0.034 -0.017 -0.077 -0.025 -0.031
Constant -0.471*** -0.398** -0.548*** -0.291* -0.463*** -0.483*** -0.603*** -0.267**
-0.066 -0.166 -0.096 -0.153 -0.058 -0.154 -0.084 -0.134
Yeardummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4401 382 2415 1604 5214 447 2921 1846
Number of Stock Code 799 93 518 492 843 101 553 533
R-squared 0.12 0.25 0.12 0.1 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.13
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Leverage=(Total Liabilities/Total assets)t-1 Leverage=(Bank Liabilities/Total assets) t-1
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Table 8: Results for Equation (2) (Fixed effect model; average leverage over previous three years)
All CSOEs LSOEs NONSOEs All CSOEs LSOEs NONSOEs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Leverage -0.087*** -0.367*** -0.120*** -0.070*** -0.151*** -0.161** -0.213*** -0.135***
-0.018 -0.096 -0.033 -0.024 -0.017 -0.069 -0.025 -0.03
LQ×Leverage -0.048*** -0.006 -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.067*** -0.013 -0.056*** -0.077***
-0.007 -0.022 -0.01 -0.013 -0.01 -0.034 -0.014 -0.018
Tobin's Qt-1 0.009*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.008*** 0.004 0.008*** 0.009***
-0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003
Size 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.043*** 0.027*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 0.046*** 0.027***
-0.004 -0.01 -0.006 -0.009 -0.004 -0.009 -0.005 -0.008
Cash 0.201*** 0.268*** 0.176*** 0.192*** 0.191*** 0.239*** 0.177*** 0.181***
-0.019 -0.082 -0.027 -0.034 -0.017 -0.079 -0.025 -0.03
Constant -0.511*** -0.404** -0.583*** -0.324** -0.502*** -0.492*** -0.628*** -0.310**
-0.066 -0.166 -0.096 -0.151 -0.058 -0.154 -0.084 -0.133
Yeardummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4401 382 2415 1604 5214 447 2921 1846
Number of Stock Code 799 93 518 492 843 101 553 533
R-squared 0.13 0.25 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.14
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Leverage=(Total Liabilities/Total assets)t-1 Leverage=(Bank Liabilities/Total assets) t-1
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Table 9 Results for Equation (1) (Instrument variable method; leverage for the prior accounting year)
All CSOEs LSOEs NONSOEs All CSOEs LSOEs NONSOEs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Leverage -0.123*** 0.108 -0.143*** -0.105*** -0.513*** -0.402*** -0.534*** -0.462***
-0.021 -0.072 -0.031 -0.035 -0.033 -0.129 -0.047 -0.056
Tobin's Qt-1 0.011*** 0.006* 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.002 0.008*** 0.006**
-0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003
Size 0.027*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.014* 0.045*** 0.043*** 0.051*** 0.028***
-0.003 -0.01 -0.005 -0.008 -0.003 -0.01 -0.005 -0.007
Cash 0.215*** 0.219*** 0.211*** 0.182*** 0.150*** 0.170** 0.153*** 0.135***
-0.017 -0.07 -0.025 -0.032 -0.017 -0.069 -0.024 -0.031
Constant -0.325*** -0.491*** -0.391*** -0.107 -0.542*** -0.506*** -0.628*** -0.264**
-0.059 -0.162 -0.084 -0.131 -0.052 -0.152 -0.077 -0.114
Yeardummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6093 513 3458 2122 6093 513 3458 2122
Number of Stock Code 924 105 599 591 924 105 599 591
R-squared 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.16
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Leverage=(Total Liabilities/Total assets)t-1 Leverage=(Bank Liabilities/Total assets) t-1
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Table 10 Results for Equation (2) (Instrument variable method; leverage for the prior accounting year))
All CSOEs LSOEs NONSOEs All CSOEs LSOEs NONSOEs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Leverage -0.113*** 0.104 -0.131*** -0.097*** -0.490*** -0.428*** -0.512*** -0.434***
-0.021 -0.072 -0.031 -0.035 -0.034 -0.129 -0.047 -0.057
LQ×Leverage -0.032*** 0.006 -0.030*** -0.035*** -0.041*** 0.036 -0.037*** -0.057**
-0.006 -0.018 -0.008 -0.011 -0.011 -0.033 -0.014 -0.023
Tobin's Qt-1 0.011*** 0.006* 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.002 0.009*** 0.006**
-0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003
Size 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.034*** 0.017** 0.046*** 0.042*** 0.052*** 0.030***
-0.003 -0.01 -0.005 -0.008 -0.003 -0.01 -0.005 -0.007
Cash 0.203*** 0.222*** 0.195*** 0.178*** 0.144*** 0.179** 0.144*** 0.132***
-0.017 -0.072 -0.025 -0.032 -0.017 -0.072 -0.024 -0.031
Constant -0.357*** -0.484*** -0.417*** -0.146 -0.563*** -0.482*** -0.644*** -0.294**
-0.059 -0.162 -0.085 -0.131 -0.053 -0.153 -0.077 -0.115
Yeardummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6093 513 3458 2122 6093 513 3458 2122
Number of Stock Code 924 105 599 591 924 105 599 591
R-squared 0.13 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.16
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Leverage=(Total Liabilities/Total assets)t-1 Leverage=(Bank Liabilities/Total assets) t-1
